In an in-depth look at a confidential NATO report, GQ examines the state of the Taliban and the future of Afghanistan
March 9, 2012
This month's issue of GQ contains an exclusive account of the 20-hour assault on the U.S. embassy in Kabul last September. As the article shows, the attack—though militarily unsuccessful—was a public relations victory for the Taliban. In February, excerpts from a classified NATO report were leaked in the press that further undermined the official U.S. military line on the war. GQ has obtained a copy of the secret report, which contains a frank assessment of the Taliban, their ties to Pakistan, and their prospects for victory over the Afghan government.
PART I: What the Report Means
The report, "State of the Taliban: January 6, 2012," is part of a regularly published series on the insurgency that's based on the interrogations of thousands of detainees. It offers an unvarnished glimpse into the inner beliefs of the military establishment in Afghanistan for two reasons: First, as a classified document, it was intended solely for internal consumption, and second, it was put together by a special operations team working under the Joint Special Operations Command, which is responsible for the US military's most secretive and demanding special forces missions, including the one that killed Osama bin Laden last year.
The special operations team that authored the report, known as Joint Task Force 3-10, allegedly helps oversee a "black site" prison at the largest US military base in the country, located at Bagram air base, just north of Kabul. In the introduction, the report describes how it was put together:
1. Who are the Taliban?
The report is remarkable for its clear-eyed view of the insurgency, a far cry from the caricature that often features in military press releases. Rather than merciless fanatics, the Taliban are portrayed as a nuanced and complex phenomenon — one deeply involved in violence and criminality, but also pragmatic and evolving, with a deep base of support among ordinary Afghans. It portrays them as motivated both by nationalistic and religious grounds:
The report puts to rest the oft-repeated idea of "ten-dollar Taliban," that is, that the insurgency is largely composed of poor Afghan men who are bribed in order to fight. "The Taliban do not fight for financial gain," it states. "Almost without exception, Taliban members do not receive salaries or other financial incentives for their work."
The largest source of the insurgency's funding, according to the report, comes from donations collected door-to-door in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as from wealthy Arab donors in the Gulf region. It downplays direct Taliban involvement in the narcotics trade, but notes that they do collect taxes from opium production in regions they control. It also states that corruption fed by international spending helps fund the insurgency.
3. Is the Taliban winning or losing?
The report's authors do appear to believe that the US-led military strategy has been having an effect on the insurgency, pressuring many of them to downgrade their operations or go to ground in Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, they see the kill-capture campaign as playing a key role:
The report levels harsh accusations of Pakistani cooperation with the insurgency, specifically with the country's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, noting that "senior Taliban leaders meet regularly with ISI personnel who advise on strategy and relay any pertinent concerns of the Government of Pakistan."
At the same time though, the report is more cautious when it comes to the nature of the link between the ISI and the Taliban:
PART I: What the Report Means
The report, "State of the Taliban: January 6, 2012," is part of a regularly published series on the insurgency that's based on the interrogations of thousands of detainees. It offers an unvarnished glimpse into the inner beliefs of the military establishment in Afghanistan for two reasons: First, as a classified document, it was intended solely for internal consumption, and second, it was put together by a special operations team working under the Joint Special Operations Command, which is responsible for the US military's most secretive and demanding special forces missions, including the one that killed Osama bin Laden last year.
The special operations team that authored the report, known as Joint Task Force 3-10, allegedly helps oversee a "black site" prison at the largest US military base in the country, located at Bagram air base, just north of Kabul. In the introduction, the report describes how it was put together:
"Throughout the year, TF 3-10 conducted over 27,000 interrogations of over 4,000 Taliban, Al Qaeda, foreign fighters and civilians. As this document is derived directly from insurgents, it should be considered informational and not necessarily analytical."While, as the authors note, the report is intended to be a presentation of the information they've gathered from detainees, in certain passages it clearly includes their own views and analysis. And though the 'black sites' operated by the CIA and special forces in Afghanistan have in the past been associated with detainee abuse, overall the interrogators seem notably sympathetic to the detainees' motivations and understanding of Afghan politics and culture.
1. Who are the Taliban?
The report is remarkable for its clear-eyed view of the insurgency, a far cry from the caricature that often features in military press releases. Rather than merciless fanatics, the Taliban are portrayed as a nuanced and complex phenomenon — one deeply involved in violence and criminality, but also pragmatic and evolving, with a deep base of support among ordinary Afghans. It portrays them as motivated both by nationalistic and religious grounds:
"[Afghan government] corruption, abuse of power and suspected lack of commitment to Islam continue to provoke significant anti-government sentiment. The Taliban will be hostile to any government which appears to act as an agent of foreign powers to instill Western values."The report makes clear the distinction between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, whose influence is seen as dissipating under the pressure of military strikes and the loss of much of its core leadership:
"In most regions of Afghanistan, Taliban leaders have no interest in associating with Al Qaeda. Working with Al Qaeda invites targeting, and Al Qaeda personnel are no longer the adept and versatile fighters and commanders they once were. Even Taliban groups with historically close ties to Al Qaeda, such as the Haqqani Network, have had little or no interaction with them in the last two years."Regarding the Haqqani Network—which was accused by US officials of being behind the attack on the embassy—the report also tones down much of the hype about the Haqqanis being a distinct and uniquely dangerous force—the so-called "Sopranos of the Afghanistan war"—stating that the group is deeply linked with the rest of the Taliban:
"Though the Haqqani Network maintains its own identity and history, it remains an integral part of the Taliban. Haqqani Network personnel changes, areas of responsibility, funding, operations , and strategy are directed by the Taliban leadership in Quetta, Pakistan."As the report notes, the term 'Haqqani Network' is not even used by its members:
"The Haqqani Network will not independently reconcile, nor are they authorized to act as spokesmen for the Taliban as a whole. Haqqani Network members refer to themselves only as Taliban. The term Haqqani Network is unknown within the group."2. Who funds the Taliban?
The report puts to rest the oft-repeated idea of "ten-dollar Taliban," that is, that the insurgency is largely composed of poor Afghan men who are bribed in order to fight. "The Taliban do not fight for financial gain," it states. "Almost without exception, Taliban members do not receive salaries or other financial incentives for their work."
The largest source of the insurgency's funding, according to the report, comes from donations collected door-to-door in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as from wealthy Arab donors in the Gulf region. It downplays direct Taliban involvement in the narcotics trade, but notes that they do collect taxes from opium production in regions they control. It also states that corruption fed by international spending helps fund the insurgency.
3. Is the Taliban winning or losing?
The report's authors do appear to believe that the US-led military strategy has been having an effect on the insurgency, pressuring many of them to downgrade their operations or go to ground in Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, they see the kill-capture campaign as playing a key role:
"Unrelenting, pinpoint ISAF operations targeting specific command elements have had a demonstrable effect on the insurgents' ability to conduct operations."At the same time however, there is a sense that, despite the vast number of insurgents who've been killed or captured, the Taliban's momentum remains unchecked.
"Though the Taliban suffered severely in 2011, its strength, motivation, funding , and tactical proficiency remains intact. [...] Despite numerous tactical setbacks, surrender is far from their collective mindset. [...] As opposed to years past, detainees have become more confident in not only their potential to win, but the virtue of their cause."Indeed, the report is far more pessimistic about the Afghan government:
"Many Afghans are already bracing themselves for an eventual return of the Taliban. [The Afghan government] continues to declare its willingness to fight, yet many of its personnel have secretly reached out to insurgents, seeking long-term options in the event of a possible Taliban victory. The Taliban recognize this trend and formalized a reconciliation system of their own."4. How does Pakistan help the Taliban?
The report levels harsh accusations of Pakistani cooperation with the insurgency, specifically with the country's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, noting that "senior Taliban leaders meet regularly with ISI personnel who advise on strategy and relay any pertinent concerns of the Government of Pakistan."
At the same time though, the report is more cautious when it comes to the nature of the link between the ISI and the Taliban:
"Despite widespread open-source reports to the contrary, detainees have provided little evidence of direct ISI funding of Taliban operations or training of Taliban personnel. Similarly, there have been no credible reports from detainees in 2011 of ISI directly providing weapons to the Taliban. Rather, the majority of ISI support appears to be through intermediaries."
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